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 1 
Disturbances, robustness and adaptation in forest commons: comparative insights from 1 
two cases in the Southeastern Alps 2 
 3 
1. Introduction  4 
Over time, rural communities and their resources have been exposed to external agents and 5 
pressures of varying nature and scale (Berkes and Davidson-Hunt, 2007). The State has been among 6 
the most important external influences, both through placing direct demands on communities and 7 
indirectly by empowering or weakening the communal resource management institutions, 8 
(Armitage, 2008; Bravo and De Moor, 2008; Landolt and Haller, 2011). A combination of State and 9 
other forces has often threatened the survival of communities, their resources and connected 10 
institutions, leading to failure and disappearance (Brandl, 2011). In other cases, the continuous 11 
interplay of different actors and forces has allowed communities to develop mechanisms to cope 12 
with, and slowly adjust to, external events, resulting in their survival in spite of external pressures 13 
and shocks (Janssen and Anderies, 2007). One key challenge emerging from the contemporary 14 
debate on adaptation is thus to understand what contributes to the persistence of communal 15 
institutions for resource management, and how they are transformed by adaptation. 16 
Much of the investigation on this subject relies on forest cases, where several examples of long-17 
lasting common-pool resource regimes, communities, and communal institutions have been 18 
identified as successful governance models (Agrawal, 2007; Ostrom and Janssen, 2004). There is a 19 
tradition of forest communities and community forestry throughout Europe (Jeanrenaud, 2001; 20 
Bravo and De Moor, 2008; Lawrence et al., 2009; Holmgren et al., 2010; Rubio-Perez and 21 
Fernándeza, 2013). In particular, the Alps are the setting for many ancient, traditional and recently-22 
re-established forest commons (Netting, 1976; Kissling-Näf et al., 2002). They have been exposed 23 
to centuries of complex history and many political and economic changes, sometimes leading to 24 
destitution or poor functionality. Yet, several forest communities survived (van Gils et al., 2014), so 25 
Alpine areas are a good laboratory for studying community forests and forest commons in order to 26 
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understand the effects of external disturbances, the factors explaining survival and the adaptive 27 
responses. However, the literature on this subject is not geographically homogeneous: despite 28 
similar experiences, peripheral areas such as the eastern Alps are underrepresented in comparison 29 
with the central Alps (Switzerland, Austria, or South Tyrol). The discourse on robustness and 30 
adaptation of the commons could therefore benefit by learning from new examples. In addition, a 31 
comparative analysis of cross State-border cases offers additional insights into the specific role 32 
played by the State as an element of disturbance. 33 
The aim of this paper is hence threefold. The first aim is to draw more attention to the forest 34 
commons of the southeastern Alps and more specifically in Slovenia and the Veneto Region of 35 
Italy1. In the last century, forest commons in Italy and Slovenia were exposed to very different state 36 
ideological, legal and policy regimes and, since then, their development patterns have started to 37 
diverge rather radically. Thus, the second aim is to do a comparative study on the role of the State 38 
as a driver for change in forest commons. The third and principal aim is to gain insights into the 39 
robustness of forest commons and related adaptation patterns in the southeastern Alps, by testing 40 
case material from eight forest commons on both sides of the border against the Ostrom design 41 
principles.  42 
 43 
2. Conceptual aspects 44 
The role of communities and their institutions in natural resource management has been explored at 45 
varying scales and by different bodies of scholarship (Armitage, 2008) that include commons 46 
theory (Ostrom, 1990; Agrawal, 2007) and resilience theory (Berkes et al., 2003). We rely on 47 
commons theory to provide the conceptual foundation for our study, starting from the definition of 48 
our unit of analysis - forest commons (hereafter FCs). While the concept of FCs is used in the 49 
                                                
1 There are other interesting areas for an expanded study of forest commons in central-eastern Italian Alps, e.g. Trentino Alto Adige 
and Friuli Venezia Giulia. The Veneto was primarily selected because one of the authors’ direct experience in this region provided 
in-depth data not published or analysed elsewhere. Another and more important reason is linked to methodological and contextual 
aspects: in Italy, the political and legal context for forestry (and forest commons) is defined at a regional level. Trentino Alto Adige 
and Friuli Venezia Giulia thus have different political-legal contexts for forest commons, which would the comparison of the two 
nation-states. 
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literature (e.g., Lidestav et al., 2010), detailed definitions are generally lacking. In this paper, we 50 
connect the definition of FCs with that of socio-ecological systems (SES). According to Janssen and 51 
Anderies, (2007), an SES is ‘a structure composed of a common-pool resource, its users, and an 52 
associated governance system’ and is the pivotal unit for studying environmental and institutional 53 
change and related adaptation processes. Our FCs could be considered a specific type of SES, 54 
where the common-pool resource is forestland (also often including pastures), the users are a 55 
community having rights to the forests (often full ownership, at times only some use rights), and the 56 
associated governance system is represented by the legal-institutional context together with the 57 
internal FC rules for managing the community and the resource. Our concept of FCs pays special 58 
attention to the attributes of ‘community’. This is conventionally taken as both a geographical and 59 
social unit, ‘... a group of people with common characteristics, needs and goals’ (SSKJ, 2000). Here 60 
the focus is on a traditional community whose characteristics have evolved over centuries of living 61 
and working in the local area, where overcoming obstacles leads to establishment of internal norms, 62 
division of roles, and last but not least, forming of emotional ties (DiGiano and Racelis, 2012).  63 
The robustness of an SES is described as the capability of ‘maintaining performance when 64 
subjected to external or internal unpredictable perturbations’ (Janssen and Anderies, 2007). 65 
Robustness can be considered a measure of success insofar as it allows SES to persist despite 66 
stressful events. According to Fleishman et al. (2010), robustness is the result of a cyclic adaptation 67 
process, of ‘modest short-term cycles of failure and recovery’. In the literature, the concept of 68 
robustness is paralleled with that of resilience, which is more widely used in ecological analysis. 69 
However, robustness puts more emphasis on the reasons for and role of human constructs: humans 70 
create rules to enhance the performance of SES (commoners, for example, craft rules for regulating 71 
the resource use and distribution of its benefits) and, by continuously adjusting these rules, they 72 
control the response to disturbances. Another strength of the reference to robustness is the attention 73 
to trade-offs: achieving greater robustness in one respect may require losing it on another (if 74 
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commoners, for example, perceive a danger of a community becoming too small, they might decide 75 
to admit new members, even if this means giving up community’s internal cohesion).  76 
Robustness is exercised in response to perturbations. Two types of perturbation, or disturbance, 77 
have been identified (Anderies et al., 2004): 1) external disturbances, which include biophysical 78 
and socio-economic changes (in markets, demography or political actions); and 2) internal 79 
disturbances, which refer to internal reorganisation resulting from changes elsewhere in the system. 80 
Change can be abrupt and discrete (Dawson et al., 2010), e.g. earthquake, landslide, change dictated 81 
by State actions such as regime change or war. Longer term challenges are posed by slow, regular, 82 
frequent or continuous change, such as climatic, demographic, or economic trends. 83 
Robust communities – social settings tending to remain balanced – react to disturbances by 84 
continuously adjusting their institutional mechanisms (Berkes and Davidson-Hunt, 2007). Those 85 
that are not robust become dysfunctional, and may ultimately dissolve. Therefore Fleischman et al. 86 
(2010) warn of sampling bias when analysing robustness, as SES that have disappeared can no 87 
longer be observed. In parallel, surviving FCs are not all necessarily robust, as they may just not 88 
have been exposed to a critical type or level of disturbance. This also applies to our context and 89 
calls for an analytical focus on robustness and not simply on persistence. Ostrom (1990) identified a 90 
set of eight design principles for assessing robustness, derived from studying cases of long-enduring 91 
institutions. With further refinements and framing within the SES concept, these principles now 92 
form one of the main references for the assessment of robustness (Ostrom, 2009, Cox et al., 2010). 93 
Agrawal (2001) also contributed to this with his conceptualisation of conditions under which groups 94 
successfully adapt to changes and self-organise. He claims that adaptive mechanisms of local 95 
communities take place due both to internal and external ties, for example, with the State or the 96 
market. It has also been argued that a ‘systematic analysis of the robustness of SES should also look 97 
at how communities deal with dynamics at various scales’ (Anderies et al., 2004) and that 98 
successful governance shows consistency between the different ‘multiple layers of nested 99 
enterprises’ (Ostrom, 1990).  This article contributes to the literature on robust common property 100 
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institutions by examining case material from eight long-enduring forest commons on both sides of 101 
the border for evidence corroborating the Ostrom design principles.  102 
 103 
3. Research methodology and data sources 104 
Given the scarcity of empirical evidence and, in particular of cross-border comparative analysis, in 105 
the region of study, our work is of an exploratory nature, aimed at identifying further scope for 106 
research. For this reason, it mostly primarily uses a qualitative approach, undertaken at different 107 
scales. The analysis of the role of the State over time and the present situation of FCs are tackled at 108 
the area scale (Veneto and Slovenia). The insights into robustness and adaptation are derived from 109 
case-studies (Yin, 2003) at the local scale based on eight FCs equally distributed between Veneto 110 
and Slovenia. 111 
We made use of different sources of information, both secondary and primary data. Secondary data 112 
were extracted from published literature, also in local languages, legal Acts, grey literature, 113 
including university degree theses. In Italy, a continuous body of literature exists documenting FCs, 114 
dealing with juridical or historical aspects, and providing many elements for understanding the role 115 
of the State (Grossi, 1977, 1998; De Martin, 1990; Nervi, 1999). Analyses of individual cases are 116 
also available (Moretto and Rosato, 2002; Casari and Plott, 2003; Pieraccini, 2008, amongst others), 117 
however they do not provide a systematic picture in a context of high diversity (Bassi, 2012), where 118 
each Region (taken as a political unit) has a different situation depending on history and political 119 
decisions. The situation in Slovenia is less well documented: the available literature is mostly from 120 
a historical perspective (Volčič, 1895; Rutar, 1896) or on juridical particularities (Britovšek, 1964; 121 
Vilfan, 1980). Recent studies place attention on expected legislative amendments (Hafner, 2011, 122 
2011a), while recent case-studies (Ogrin, 1989, Premrl, 2008, Šprajcar, 2012 and others) 123 
complement grey literature. However, the overall situation has only been addressed from 124 
geographical (Petek and Urbanc, 2007) and forestry (Ravtar, 1938, Bogataj, 1990; Bogataj and Krč, 125 
2014) viewpoints. 126 
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Primary data were collected from different sources to complement the literature. In order to provide 127 
an updated picture of FCs in Veneto, unpublished results from a field survey undertaken for a 128 
master degree thesis (Battaglia, 2011) were used. In addition to other ownership types, the survey 129 
targeted two types of community forest owners in Veneto: municipalities and Regole, the latter 130 
being a specific type of collective forest ownership (Merlo et al., 1989). Basic information, such as 131 
the size and management of property, community of reference, and existing rights were collected 132 
through face-to-face interviews. The survey covered 138 units, of which 84 were municipal forests 133 
and 54 collective properties. Twenty-seven municipal forests lack community forest rights, and as 134 
such were found not to comply with our definition of FCs (forestland, a community having rights 135 
on it, and the associated governance system). Thus, the data reported for a contemporary portrait of 136 
Italian FCs are based on 111 units. The Slovenian list of FCs since post-independence contains 137 
upwards of 600 units, depending on source and period: 660 (Petek and Urbanc, 2007 from Dodič 138 
1993 personal archive), 665 officially registered in 2007 (ibid.) and 638 cited in MKO (2013).  139 
For case-study analysis we relied on the analysis of documents and some additional empirical data. 140 
For Veneto, crucial information for understanding compliance of FCs with Ostrom’s principles is 141 
found in their charters and forest by-laws. Charters define the community’s assets as well as the 142 
basic institutional rules that regulate the internal life of the community (Martello and Tommasella, 143 
2010). By-laws are more specific as to the definition of forest use. In Slovenia this source of 144 
information could not be used, as many archives from the southeastern Alpine area were burnt or 145 
lost during the two World Wars (Rodela, 2012) and original charters are still being sought. Newly 146 
formed charters follow the model provided by the State for re-registration purposes in the 1990s, so 147 
they were not crafted by the community. Source material were drawn from the latest case studies 148 
done by Mlekuž (2011), Deisinger (2012), Šprajcar (2012) and Anko (2013), as well as minutes 149 
from two official meetings. The first meeting was organised by the Chamber of Agriculture in 2011 150 
(attended by 66 representatives, of whom approximately 60% are from the southeastern Alps); the 151 
other was organised by the Association of Commons in 2013 (44 representatives). 152 
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In both countries information was also elicited through participation in workshops or personal 153 
communications from key informants, such as present and past leaders of FCs and their 154 
associations, FC members, and representatives of forest institutions and parks. 155 
 156 
4. Emergence and development of FCs in Veneto and Slovenia 157 
Three relevant historical periods can be identified in the life of FCs in the area: origin and 158 
emergence of FCs, disruption, and renaissance. This section aims at highlighting the role of the 159 
State in all of them, with particular emphasis on the extinction of several FCs during the last 160 
century. Our historical perspective attempts to capture adaptation based on the interactions of 161 
community members over many generations (Agrawal, 2001, 2010; Ostrom et al., 2002; Young et 162 
al., 2006).  163 
Origins and emergence of FCs 164 
The origin of FCs in medieval times as an integral element of early Alpine communities’ natural 165 
environment is a point of consensus among Slovenian and Italian scholars (Graberski, 1850; 166 
Britovšek, 1964; Vilfan, 1980; Zanderigo Rosolo, 1982); the earliest records date to the early 13th 167 
century (Casari and Plott, 2003). In the remote Alpine valleys, common ownership and 168 
management of natural resources (forests and pastures) was developed by the first settlers as a 169 
strategy to ensure community endurance under extreme natural conditions and with scarce 170 
resources (Zanderigo Rosolo, 1982). Over time, the communities crafted rules regulating 171 
membership (based on the household as basic unit), use of pastures, forests and village 172 
infrastructure, restricting individual uses, setting fines for violations, appointing or electing the 173 
officials in charge of administration and monitoring (Casari, 2007). External recognition was 174 
provided by a long period of relatively stable political, juridical and economic autonomy, although 175 
with local differences (Fabbiani, 1972; Mlekuž, 1992). The economic power of FCs during more 176 
than six hundred years of prosperity is attributed to strategic role of timber trade and dairy products 177 
and on negotiated political freedom (Tagliapietra, 2011), granting loyalty to different authorities 178 
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according to the most favourable circumstances. For most parts of Veneto, this period lasted until 179 
the fall of the Republic of Venice in 1797. In Slovenian areas under the Austro-Hungarian Empire it 180 
continued until the end of the feudal period in 1848, when FCs bought land from feudal lords and 181 
thus became formal land owners (Šimac, 1993). Slovenian FCs enjoyed legislative recognition 182 
under the Austro-Hungarian Empire, yet the State enabled and promoted their voluntary division in 183 
order to support the modernisation of agriculture (Britovšek, 1964). Communities did not respond 184 
homogenously – some divided their land, others resisted for diverse reasons (Smrdel, 1991). Many 185 
began but never completed division due to costs, internal disagreements, and upcoming political 186 
and economic disruptions (Bogataj et al., 2012).  187 
Disruptions 188 
The first disruption came in 1806, heralded by Napoleon’s institutional reform in Veneto and 189 
Western Slovenia. Based on administrative centralisation, this forcibly transferred community 190 
ownership to municipalities, representatives of State authority. Although many influential legal 191 
scholars contend that only decision-making powers were transferred (Cerulli Irelli, 1992), 192 
municipalities were de facto registered as owners of the forestland, leaving communities with only 193 
some use-rights. Instead, the process of division of more productive lands continued in Eastern 194 
Slovenia (Interview 1).  195 
Population decline in the area regardless of borders started in the second half of 19th century and 196 
continued for decades for diverse reasons, not analysed here. In the 20th century, FCs in the SE Alps 197 
were disrupted by assignment of Western Slovenia to Italy after World War I. In Italy, the fascist 198 
regime ensued and issued a Land Reform Act (1766/1927), further radically excluding community 199 
members from resource management decision-making in both agriculture and forestry. Forest 200 
management rights still in the control of local communities were definitively taken over by 201 
municipalities. For the territories still in Slovenia, this same period saw three political regimes 202 
following one another, ending with the kingdom of Yugoslavia, which formally acknowledged FCs 203 
(Act, 1930) but re-focused on distant Balkan regions and faced a serious economic crisis 204 
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(Lazarević, 1994). FCs in the southeastern Alps therefore were forced to adapt to rapid political 205 
changes, division between two States and consequent consolidation of their institutional layers. In 206 
both countries they also had to adapt to their economic marginalisation. Within a decade, the area 207 
experienced another political conflict, World War II, which ended with an ideological and welfare 208 
division in the form of a new, globally rooted, demarcation line between Italy and Slovenia: the 209 
‘Iron Curtain’. To its east was an undemocratic regime, which declared ‘community’ and ‘equality’ 210 
to be its foundational concepts. The land of Slovenian commons was nationalised (Act, 1947) and 211 
FCs were abolished for approximately sixty years (Acts 1953, 1956, 1965). It is therefore no 212 
surprise that statistics for this period are absent, literature scarce, and so we had to rely on oral 213 
sources. However, the continued informal functioning of FCs during this period is widely 214 
confirmed by those who remained2. Additional interviews3 and literature sources (Drobnjak, 2002; 215 
Mlekuž, 2011) concur that this was possible under two conditions: 1) forestry or other officials 216 
recognised and respected the existence of the FCs, and 2) the social structure did not change greatly 217 
due to substantial decline of the number of members for emigration reasons. 218 
This series of actions on the part of the State severely affected FCs in both Veneto and Slovenia. In 219 
some cases the result was irreversible disappearance: common lands were divided, internal 220 
institutional norms were abandoned, and their written and oral intergenerational transmittance was 221 
discontinued. Evidence available allows identification of their official number decline while 222 
eventual internal differentiation into more or less robust has yet to be analysed. 223 
Renaissance of FCs  224 
In Veneto, reinstitution of FCs started soon after the war thanks to an encouraging political climate 225 
where bottom up actions from the most powerful Regole in Belluno encountered the support of an 226 
outstanding legal scholar, Giangastone Bolla, and a favourable attitude of part of the magistrature 227 
and of the government. Legislative Decree 1104/1948 reinstated the Magnifica Comunità Cadorina, 228 
others then followed with National Act 991/1952. In 1972, institutional decentralisation gave many 229 
                                                
2 Deisinger, 2012 and interviews number 3, 3a, 3b, 5, 6 
3 Interviews number 1, 2, 3a, 4 
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legislative powers to regional governments, including jurisdiction of forests and regulating 230 
collective forestland ownership. In 1975, Veneto initially recognised sixteen Regole in Comelico, 231 
then it issued Act 26/1996 ‘on the reconstitution of Regole’ (modified in 2012 to allow additional 232 
reconstitutions). Slovenia began this process after independence in 1991 when denationalisation, 233 
reestablishment of Commons and restitution of their property and rights (Act 1994) began. By 2001 234 
when restitution expired, one third of the pre-WWI total had been registered (MKO, 2013, Volčič, 235 
1895). Given continued lack of attention by the state, and the fact that the shares of commoners who 236 
died, emigrated or were simply intimidated on the land of FCs commoners had been absorbed for 237 
local infrastructure or enlargement of villages. It is difficult to estimate the number of irreversibly 238 
dissolved FCs. The situation of Veneto is similar, as estimates of how many FCs disappeared 239 
completely from the map are fully not available. However on-line information from State archives 240 
(SIUSA, 2015) mention cases of Regole absorbed by the municipalities after Napoleon and never 241 
re-established. Bolla (1992) counted in 1945, 81 Regole in the sole Province of Belluno, which is a 242 
part of Veneto. Today, in Belluno, the reconstituted Regole are 53, while the remaining from his list 243 
are still functioning as Municipalities. 244 
 245 
5. A contemporary portrait 246 
Official forest statistics (Regione Veneto, 2013) report that the total forest area in Veneto today is 247 
nearly 420,000 hectares, of which 27.9% belong to municipalities, 5.5% to the region or the 248 
national state, 60.3% to private individuals, companies or the church, and 6.3% to Regole. Since our 249 
analysis included some municipal land (as it complied with the definition of FCs, especially for the 250 
presence of use rights), the situation reported in Table 1 has a higher percentage of forest area in the 251 
FCs category than just that of Regole. In Veneto, land under diverse forms of FCs is substantial in 252 
comparison with State or Regional ownership; in addition, each unit owns a considerable amount of 253 
forestland, much larger than the average size of individual private forest property – estimated at 254 
around 7 hectares in Italy (Merlo, 1998), and larger for municipalities than Regole. The size of the 255 
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membership also differs markedly between the two forms, corresponding to different admittance 256 
rules (see section 6), ranging from more than 18,000 in the largest municipality to 67 members in 257 
the smallest Regola.  258 
Table 1. Forest Commons in Veneto and Slovenia today 259 
Indicator Veneto Slovenia 
Total number of FCs  111* 638 
Total forest area under FCs (ha) 95,902 77,486 
Share of forest area under FCs out of 
total forest area of region/country 
23% 6.5% 
Average size of forest area per FC (ha) Municipalities: 1,137 
Regole: 971 
147 
Average number of members per FC Municipalities: 1,226  
Regole: 244  
33 
* of which 57 Municipalities and 54 Regole 260 
Sources: Battaglia, 2011 for Veneto; MKO, 2013 for Slovenia. 261 
The forest ownership structure in Slovenia has changed substantially since denationalisation, from 262 
prevailing state ownership to the recent 75% private forest area, 22% of state forests and 3% under 263 
local community ownership (SFS, 2012). Considering land of FCs private estates is inconsistent 264 
with their official presentation under the community ownership category. However, their distinct 265 
presentation from individual ownership also informs us that in Slovenia, after the State, FCs are 266 
separate (and also the largest land owner/user) category in terms of average estate, which may still 267 
rise as 9,000 hectares of their land are still in the process of de-nationalisation. Their forest area 268 
(and consequently its share) might therefore rise and become closer to the Venetian, what would 269 
also contribute to the equalisation with estimation based on their number and average estate, now 270 
inclined toward smaller entities. Communities of FCs consist of a total of nearly 20,000 people 271 
(Petek and Urbanc, 2007), among which only some registered their share. Some refused individual 272 
registration for diverse reasons (e.g. insistence on common and not co-ownership, eventual 273 
individual taxation and other reasons). Their internal structure, for which data is hard to obtain, is 274 
mostly defined by male representatives of households (Bogataj, 2012; Interview 1). Past political 275 
action resulted in more types of FCs, but there are no data to delimit dysfunctional from dissolved 276 
FCs, just some indications (Mlekuž, 2011; Association, 2013a, Interview 1): i) functional and 277 
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particularly active FCs; ii) inactive ones, due to revival starting after registration opportunity 278 
expired in 2001 (Chamber, 2011; Association, 2013), to length of denationalisation period, or to 279 
fragmentation or ill-functioning; and iii) dissolved FCs. 280 
The disruption caused by regimes attempting to weaken or even wipe out local community-based 281 
institutions has played a major role in the attrition of many FCs, as shown by our historical analysis. 282 
State action led to the disaffection of local communities deprived of their decision making rights 283 
(Germanò, 1994) or even of full ownership (Interviews 1, 2). Several FCs dissolved as result 284 
(SIUSA, 2015), others continue to function with much less institutional and political recognition, 285 
and some are in a liminal state, lacking the institutional capacity and/or evidence of historical title 286 
to be fully reinstated. Thus, State enforcement of common property is a crucial factor permitting or 287 
impeding FC survival. When the State withdrew its support, FCs had to find the strength to survive 288 
internally and to gain at least State tolerance. 289 
Comparison of the figures in Table 1 shows that today Slovenian and Veneto FCs differ 290 
structurally, despite their common origin: the Slovenian FCs are more fragmented, higher in 291 
number but smaller in forest area and community size. Their share of the total national land is also 292 
smaller. We argue that these differences are ‘path dependent’ (Dietz et al., 2002; Heinmiller, 2009). 293 
With the re-institution of the democratic States, communities in both countries started legal action 294 
to obtain restitution, but the intensity and speed of revival differs. Restitution appears to be more 295 
rapid and successful in Veneto, supported by a more favourable legal context, while Slovenia’s FCs 296 
seem to be more marginalised. While the reasons for these differences are multiple and complex, 297 
State action appears to be pivotal. A reason can be found in the availability of archives. In Veneto, 298 
the reconstituted communities were able to support their claims with all the needed cadastral and 299 
archival evidence (property references, ancient charters); in Slovenia most land titles had been lost 300 
and oral sources and proof require more time to be traced. These hypotheses, here only briefly 301 
touched upon, certainly deserve further research. 302 
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Regardless of the side of the border, reasons for the persistence and renaissance of FCs in the 303 
southeastern Alps and the differences among them, can also be sought through the lens of 304 
robustness. Thus, in the next section we will try to assess if FCs in Slovenia and Veneto are robust, 305 
whether robustness can explain the differences between Italy and Slovenia or inside each country, 306 
and, lastly, if their present adaptation paths are converging or diverging. 307 
6. Robustness and adaptation of FCs in the southeastern Alps 308 
Although persistence per se is not a proof of robustness, it can be surmised that FCs that survived or 309 
were revived after a long period of disturbances, display elements of robustness. To test this 310 
hypothesis, we analysed eight southeastern Alps cases in terms of their consistency with Ostrom’s 311 
design principles. The cases are: in Veneto, Regole of Ampezzo (case V1), Regola of Monte Salatis 312 
(V2), Municipality of Asiago (V3), Municipality of Conco (V4), and Commons of Čezsoča (S5), 313 
Ljubinj (S6), Bohinjska Bistrica (S7), MKK – Meščanska Korporacija Kamnik (S8), for Slovenia. 314 
These case studies were chosen based on: 1) variability in history and location; 2) active forest 315 
management; 3) availability of documentation; and 4) authors’ repeated contacts in the 2010-2014 316 
period. We looked at overall robustness as well as the comparative robustness of individual cases. 317 
The data are summarised in Table 2, while further detailed narratives are provided in supplementary 318 
material.  319 
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Veneto Slovenia  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Year of ‘birth’ 1200/1959 1606/2006 1806 1806 1830/1995 - - (1783) /1866 
CLEARLY DEFINED BOUNDARIES 
Land  
Y- yes (formal Act, Cadastre) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Community membership 
D=Descendants of original families 
but modifications, R= Residents 
DM D R R DM D 
DM 
 DM; 
How is it acquired 
H – heritage, A-Acceptance,  
AUTX-Automatically after x years 
H, A H, A AUT15 AUT7 H, A - H, A H, A 
How it is lost 
Non-Non-residency, O-other Non, O Non, O Non, O Non, O O - O O 
CONGRUENCE BETWEEN APPROPRIATION AND PROVISION RULES AND LOCAL CONDITIONS 
FMP - Forest Management Plan,  
Add  - Additional rules FMP, Add FMP, Add FMP, Add FMP, Add FMP, Add FMP, Add FMP FMP, Add 
COLLECTIVE ACTIONS 
Constitutional principle Specific 
ownership 
type, land 
indivisible 
Specific 
ownership 
type, land 
indivisible 
Public 
ownership by 
definition 
Public 
ownership by 
definition 
Private but joint 
ownership 
Private but joint 
ownership 
Private but joint 
ownership 
Private but joint 
ownership 
Principle for distribution of forest 
products 
(beneficiaries) 
M- members, LC-local community, 
O-others 
M, LC M, LC LC LC M, LC M, LC M M, LC 
Control rights of members 
OB– own bodies, EI-exerted 
indirectly 
OB OB EI EI OB OB OB OB , EI 
Use rights and distributional rule  
F-firewood, M-money, T-timber x 
times 
F, T1 F F, T1 F, T1 F, T? F - F, M 
Distribution of monetary income 
S-social, cultural purposes, F- forest, 
AM- aid to members in need e.g. 
young families 
S, AM S, AM F, S - F, S, AM - S S, AM 
Duties of members (additional to 
norms) 
A-Administration, P-physical work, 
O-other 
Ad Ad - - - P O Ad 
Decision-making process 
  I-internal, O-other I I O O I I I I 
Role of Women 
E- equal, U-unequal U E E E E - -  E 
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MONITORING, SANCTIONS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMS 
Monitoring rules  
(Nor-Norms only, I-internal, E-
external) 
I I - E Nor, E Nor Nor, E E 
Sanctions 
R-low reputation, M-monetary fines, 
Ex-exclusion 
R - M - R E   
MINIMAL RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS AND NESTED ENTERPRISES 
Constitutional rule Land cannot be sold  
Permanent land-use changes must be compensated by other land Selling of land is limited by Statutes (or not) while officially it is possible 
Legal recognition of particular 
ownership type 
Y- yes, N- no 
Y N 
Nesting with different institutional 
level 
Y-yes, R-regional, NAT-national, C-
civil society 
YR, NAT YNAT YC 
Main reference  Pertile, 1889; 
Charter 
(approved 
1985), by-law 
Zoccoletto, 
2013; Charter 
(approved 
2014), by-law 
By-law 
(approved by 
the Municipality 
in 1995) 
By-law 
(approved by 
Municipality 
in 2005) 
Šprajcar, 2012, Mlekuž, 2011,  
Interviews 1, 3, 3a, 3,b, 4 
Deisinger, 2012, Pravila 2012,  
Interviews 1, 4, 5 
320 
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Ostrom design principles: 320 
Clearly defined boundaries: All the FCs have full knowledge of their boundaries, which are clearly 321 
stated in their constitutive documents. However, we noted that more emphasis in defining 322 
boundaries is put on the ‘community’ rather than on the land. In all cases, membership rules are 323 
detailed, strictly prescribed and monitored. In the Regole and Slovenian FCs, membership is gained 324 
through inheritance or can also be acquired under very selective conditions, namely: new (non-325 
descendant) members are accepted only after having proved they have lived in the area for a long 326 
time and have a reputation among local people. This signals the importance given to community 327 
cohesion, based on the belief that individuals have, share and practice common values, presumably 328 
important vis à vis actual and potential external disturbances. In the two Veneto municipalities 329 
(whose origin as landowners is connected to the Napoleon’ action) the definition of membership is 330 
less stringent, which can be explained by the lesser importance of the interests at stake, dealing only 331 
with use rights as opposed to full control rights as in the Regole. Indeed, any concerns about 332 
possibly jeopardizing survival or long-term functioning linked to membership issues are a subject 333 
for internal discussion, at times including proposals for adaptation. Cases V2 and S7 can serve as 334 
examples, both of which altered membership rules in their new Charters. Due to new value placed 335 
on gender equity in case V2, a more inclusive rule was crafted with regards to admittance of 336 
women. In case S7, membership was increasing due to the general State law of inheritance, so there 337 
are now internal limits to the number of heirs.  338 
Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions: In all cases there are 339 
specific references to planned management, demonstrating high awareness of the value of the 340 
resource and willingness to conserve it, with a strong emphasis on long-term sustainability. Even if 341 
regulated management is prescribed by law, and thus not a deliberate choice of the FCs, there are 342 
often additional and more detailed prescriptions on land use, forest management, allowable cuts and 343 
forestry operations. In case S8, identity is rooted in forestry, as a forest management ‘vision’ is also 344 
provided. 345 
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Collective-choice arrangements: All eight case studies report internal arrangements based on 346 
principles of ‘solidarity’ in response to needs of community members and ‘equity’ in terms of 347 
balance of rights with duties. Centrality of community is again a priority, e.g., in cases V1, V2 and 348 
S7, where the basic principle is that everything is held in common. When communities hold full 349 
control rights (6 cases, excluding the municipalities), they invest a lot of effort in definition and 350 
realisation of decision-making procedures, selection of authorities and distribution rights. Avoiding 351 
friction is a priority. Consensus-building is formalised through democratic assembly decision-352 
making and elective leadership is undertaken in turn by members. Such sophisticated rules reflect 353 
the iterative nature of long-term adaptation, based on experience of past disputes and the search for 354 
solutions. Interviewees (in southeastern Alps, as elsewhere) report that disputes were - after 355 
punishment and resolution - finally celebrated with festivities in order to keep the community 356 
cohesive. The two municipality cases appear weaker in this respect. Another collective choice 357 
arrangement deals with equity of users and distribution of goods. The same signal is provided by all 358 
cases following the same logic in both Veneto and Slovenia: conservation of the resources and 359 
immaterial heritage comes first, strategic benefits for the whole community follow, then distribution 360 
is possible, primarily to community members, especially young families and only then to 361 
individuals, if at all. Profit is strictly controlled and used to cover common needs (infrastructure 362 
establishment or maintenance). 363 
Monitoring and conflict resolution rules: Our analysis shows that, although monitoring and conflict 364 
resolution rules do exist in all cases, they do not seem to be a priority for the FCs, as they occupy 365 
little space in their documents and personal communications. One explanation is that these rules are 366 
redundant, as the FCs are embedded in a well-defined legal context, where rules are already 367 
provided. In addition, we can assume that the strict membership control already functions as a 368 
precautionary measure so that informal, unwritten moral and social codes work better in this regard: 369 
this is further supported by the findings of van Gils et al. (2014) for the pastoral commons of West 370 
Tyrol. 371 
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Minimal recognition of rights and nested enterprises is achieved as FCs’ constitutional rules are 372 
nested within higher tiers of governance systems in both Veneto and Slovenia, where minimum 373 
recognition of rights is guaranteed by both States (and regional Government in Italy). In Veneto, 374 
Regole are considered as private group-property, a type distinct from public or private, and 375 
safeguarded as ‘providing several public goods’ (Act 26/1996). They are also recognised as a legal 376 
entity, thus gaining access (often even priority) to public funds for rural development. Basic 377 
constitutional provisions of their charters such as inalienability, indivisibility and conservation of 378 
primary destination for agro-silvo-pastoral activities are backed up in national and regional 379 
legislations. In Slovenia FCs are regulated according to general private ownership principles, 380 
without any distinctive ownership type, but are obliged to provide some public goods such as 381 
access. 382 
Based on this initial analysis, we can conclude that all our cases fundamentally comply with 383 
Ostrom’s principles of institutional robustness. On the basis of this theory and growing corpus of 384 
evidence, their persistence and stable functioning can therefore be generally explained by their 385 
robustness. Investigating differences in degrees of robustness among all FCs and between the 386 
Slovenian and Veneto cases, we found more similarities between countries than internally. For 387 
example, the two Veneto Regole and four Slovenian FCs have many aspects in common, from 388 
membership rules based on inheritance, to internal governance bodies, from democratic decision-389 
making processes to equity and solidarity as basic principles. What also becomes apparent is that 390 
the two municipalities, despite sharing some of Ostrom’s principles with the other cases, are more 391 
distant from the core concept of ‘textbook’ commons, lacking for example the typical internal direct 392 
decision-making tools. It may be objected that this difference is inherent in the research approach, 393 
which accepted the municipality as a form of FCs. We argue that municipalities with use-rights, 394 
even if not precisely Commons, are at least a form of community forests, functioning on a lower 395 
level but having the potential to return to their original state. Case V1, after a long debate and some 396 
juridical verdicts, initiated the restitution process in 2012 (Resolution of Municipal Council, 2012), 397 
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while seventeen former Municipalities have been reinstated as Regole in Veneto since 1996. How 398 
this process will affect the rural communities, municipal budgets, and the use and management of 399 
forest resources, is an interesting topic to be explored in the years to come. 400 
National differences among FCs emerge distinctly only for monitoring rules, which occur more 401 
often in Veneto than in Slovenia, and for minimal recognition and nesting. The latter finding points 402 
to the conclusion that although State-driven disruptions over the last two centuries resulted in 403 
changed FC ownership structures, where they did not succeed in fully demolishing FC’s internal 404 
institutional structures, the remaining cross-border similarities outweigh their differences. 405 
If our analysis has contributed to understanding the present situation of FCs in the two case study 406 
areas, it does have some limitations. One is that, especially for Veneto, our conclusions are based 407 
solely on data extracted from an analysis of FCs’ Charters and by-laws. However, robustness 408 
analysis should go further, considering how adjustments are made to rules. Indeed, this occurs first 409 
by changing operational, unwritten, everyday rules and, only later, by changing the constitutional 410 
rules. So the next analytical step should focus on whether and how rules are adapting. This calls for 411 
further field research to gain insights into the life of the communities and internal decision-making 412 
processes. At the same time, gaps in this research highlight the need to search for original 413 
documents in Slovenia and improve overall statistics on the disposition of FCs. 414 
Today, three main disturbances again challenge the adaptive capacity of FCs in the southeastern 415 
Alps. The first is communities’ internal demographic structure, with shrinking (Lorenzi, 2010) or 416 
expanding numbers of members. The second is a decrease of participation in workload or decision-417 
making procedures. Robustness is challenged by more open and socially inclusive models, 418 
accepting higher community heterogeneity and changed balances between resources and local 419 
conditions. For example FCs in Slovenia had to accept new types of members, e.g. the State, 420 
municipalities, and enterprises, which impact their future developmental direction. Veneto’s Regole 421 
had to finally take into consideration the issue of women (Ianese, 2001). The third is the loosening 422 
of rural communities’ ties with their resources, which opens the path to conflicts and controversies 423 
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between forestry and agricultural uses and infrastructure, urban development, recreational or 424 
amenity use (Gatto et al., 2012). FCs still use their strong constitutional rules to prevent undesirable 425 
land use changes and financial speculation4: in this case, robustness is gained not through change, 426 
but through sticking to the ‘old’ core rules, in the awareness of their still being fully suited to tackle 427 
modern challenges. The last challenge concerns adaptation vis à vis the State, Despite past 428 
differentiation of State regimes, adaptation patterns now show a convergent but not yet coincident 429 
trend in Veneto and Slovenia. FCs in both countries prompted virtuous circles by lobbying at 430 
different legal levels to obtain favourable legislation. 431 
 432 
7. Conclusions  433 
The primary aim of this paper was to shed more light on typical forms of community forests in 434 
Veneto and Slovenia. These cases from a corner of the Alps add to the discourse on commons and 435 
community forestry in Europe. With their proven capacity to survive, at least in some cases, FCs in 436 
Veneto and Slovenia can offer a contribution to the analysis of disturbances, robustness and 437 
adaptation and to the search for successful governance models in forestry. The limitation of our 438 
analysis due to scant and sometime not cross-consistent data steers future efforts into improving 439 
statistics at national-regional scale, engaging in new in-depth field research of individual case 440 
studies, and incorporating other significant elements such as population and market changes.  441 
The comparative approach has highlighted the role of the State, undeniable and powerful in 442 
disrupting or fostering the life of the communities, to the point that internal governance structures 443 
alone are not sufficient to guarantee community survival. The variety addressed by broadening the 444 
time perspective and undertaking cross-border approaches has not only enhanced our capability to 445 
critically assess disturbances and robustness but, more importantly, has ultimately resulted in a 446 
                                                
4 The case of Regole d’Ampezzo is well-known. This prosperous Regole fiercely opposed a plan to build a transnational highway 
across their land and finally obtained the designation of protected area from the regional government and their entrustment as park 
managers (Lorenzi and Borrini-Feyerabend, 2010). 
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chance for mutual learning. Because they still have the same original core constituents, FCs in 447 
Veneto and Slovenia can be a source of inspiration and ideas for one another. 448 
Although limited by the type of data analysed, the insights into robustness have allowed us to 449 
provide some reasons for the survival of FCs in the southeastern Alps, but also to observe the 450 
current, not always successful, adaptation efforts. Difficult and slow progress in rethinking 451 
membership rules and renegotiating the balance between equity and sustainable resource use at a 452 
local level show that the paradigmatic narrative of commons as ideal communities or an ‘ideal 453 
regulatory system’ (Kissling Näf, 2002) should not always be taken for granted. In addition, at a 454 
higher institutional level, it appears that the action of the State cannot simply be translated into top-455 
down measures, but requires long-term adaptation of all nested levels. Harmonious and consistent 456 
interaction between bottom-up and top-down principles has to still to evolve, especially in Slovenia. 457 
The crucial message and lesson from FC practices in the southeastern Alps may thus lie in 458 
accepting a variety of specific local patterns of balance between nature and society, and the 459 
recognition that FC models are not ideal, but robust and adaptive. 460 
 461 
References 462 
Act 1766/1927. Riordinamento degli usi civici. GU 228, 3 ottobre 1927. Regno d’Italia. 463 
Act, 1930. Zakon o gozdih. Uradni list kraljevske banske uprave dravske banovine, Ljubljana, 464 
28.2.1930, letnik I, No. 35. kos, 162. 465 
Act 1947. Zakon o agrarnih skupnostih. UL LRS 52-323/47. Ljubljana. 466 
Act 1953. Zakon o kmetijskem zemljiškem skladu SLP in o dodeljevanju zemlje kmetijskim 467 
organizacijam (UL FLRJ 22-150/53 and 22-78/53. Ljubljana. 468 
Act 1956. Zakon o upravljanju in o gospodarjenju s premoženjem bivših agrarnih skupnosti. UL 469 
Ljudske republike Slovenije, 7/56, 27/1-56, Ljubljana.  470 
Act 1965. Zakon o razpolaganju s premoženjem bivših agrarnih skupnosti. ULRS 462-1/65, 471 
Ljubljana. 472 
Act 1994. Zakon o ponovni vzpostavitvi agrarnih skupnosti ter vrnitvi njihovega premoženja in 473 
pravic, UL 5/1994, Ljubljana. 474 
 22 
Act 26/1996. Disciplina delle Regole. BUR n. 76/1996, Regione Veneto (and subsequent adaptation 475 
of Act 13/2012). 476 
Act 991/1952. Provvedimenti in favore dei territori montani. GU n. 176 of July 7, 1952, Italy. 477 
Agrawal, A., 2001. Common property institutions and sustainable governance of resources. World 478 
Development, 29, 10, 1649-1672. 479 
Agrawal, A., 2007. Forest, governance and sustainability: Common property theory and its 480 
contributions. International Journal of the Commons, 1, 1, 111-136. 481 
Anderies, J. M., Janssen, Ostrom, E., 2004. A Framework to Analyse the Robustness of SES from 482 
an institutional perspective. Ecology and Society 9 (1): 18 online URL: 483 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss1/art18/ 484 
Anko, B., 2013. Planine ob zgornji gozdni meji. In: Bogataj, N. (ed.). 2013. Znamenja trajnosti. 485 
Andragoški center Slovenije, 98-10. 486 
Armitage, D., 2008. Governance and the commons in a multi-level world. International Journal of 487 
the Commons, 2, 1, 7-32. 488 
Association, 2013. Association of FCs, minutes, Hrpelje, 8.10. 2013. 489 
Association, 2013 a. Association of  FCs, minutes, Lukovica, 26.1.2013.  490 
Battaglia, A., 2011, La valorizzazione della montagna veneta attraverso la produzione di beni e 491 
servizi ambientali: un’analisi della struttura e delle caratteristiche delle proprietà forestali. 492 
Master Degree Thesis (supervisor Paola Gatto). University of Padova. 493 
Bassi, M., 2012. Recognition and Support of ICCAs in Italy. In: Kothari, A. with Corrigan, C., 494 
Jonas, H., Neumann, A., and Shrumm, H. (eds). Recognising and Supporting Territories and 495 
Areas Conserved By Indigenous Peoples And Local Communities: Global Overview and 496 
National Case Studies. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, ICCA Consortium, 497 
Kalpavriksh, and Natural Justice, Montreal, Canada. Technical Series no. 64. 498 
Berkes, F., Davidson-Hunt, I., 2007. Communities and social enterprises in the age of globalisation. 499 
Journal of Enterprising Communities, 1, 3, 209-221. 500 
Berkes, F., Colding, J., Folke, C. (eds.), 2003. Navigating social-ecological systems: building 501 
resilience for complexity and change. Cambridge University Press. 502 
Bogataj, N., 1990. Človek in gozd na Krasu: diplomska naloga (bachelor thesis). Biotechnical 503 
University, Ljubljana. 504 
Bogataj, N., 2012. Model delovanja slovenskih agrarnih skupnosti. In: Rodela, R. (ed.), 505 
Soupravljanje naravnih virov : vaške skupnosti in sorodne oblike skupne lastnine in skupnega 506 
upravljanja. Wageningen: Wageningen University and Research Centre, 23-37.  507 
 23 
Bogataj, N., Krč, J., 2014. A Forest commons revival in Slovenia. Society and Natural Resources: 508 
An International Journal: 0: 1-15. Taylor&Francis Group, LLC. URL: 509 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08941920.2014.918225 [accessed Sept 24, 2014]. 510 
Bogataj, N., Šebalj Mikše, Š., Mlekuž, I., Krč, J., 2012. Slovenian forest commons - cases of 511 
collective resource management. In: Selter, B. (Ed.), Forest Commons - Role Model for 512 
Sustainable Local Governance and Forest Management. Booklet 22 of the State Forestry 513 
Administration series North Rhine-Westphalia, pp. 30-34. 514 
Bolla, G., 1992. Per la tutela della proprietà comune “Regoliera” del Cadore. In: Romagnoli E., 515 
Trebeschi C., Germanò A. e Trebeschi A. (eds.) Comunioni Familiari Montane - VOL. II, Atti 516 
del seminario di studio: Per una proprietà collettiva moderna - Testi legislativi, sentenze, studi, 517 
Brescia: Paideia Editrice Brescia  p. 662. 518 
Brandl, H., 2011. The commons in south west Germany: prosperity, decline and transformation. 519 
IUFRO International Conference on Small Scale Forestry: Synergies and Conflicts in Social, 520 
Ecological and Economic Interactions, Freiburg, Germany. July 2011. 521 
Bravo, G., De Moor, T., 2008. The commons in Europe: from past to future. International Journal 522 
of the Commons, 2, 2, 155-161. 523 
Britovšek, M., 1964. Razkroj fevdalne agrarne strukture na Kranjskem. Razprave in eseji, 524 
Slovenske Matice, 5, 81-165. 525 
Casari, M., 2007. Emergence of endogenous Legal Institutions: property rights and Community 526 
governance in the Italian Alps. The Journal of Economic History, 67, 191-226. 527 
Casari, M., Plott, C. R., 2003. Decentralised management of common property resources: 528 
experiments with a century-old institution. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organisation, 51, 529 
217-247. 530 
Chamber of agriculture and forestry, minutes, Lukovica, 8.9.2011. 531 
Cerulli Irelli, V., 1992. Verso una nuova Legge Nazionale sugli «Usi Civici»: I problemi aperti. in: 532 
Romagnoli E., Trebeschi C., Germanò A. e Trebeschi A. (eds.) Comunioni Familiari Montane - 533 
VOL. II, Atti del seminario di studio: Per una proprietà collettiva moderna - Testi legislativi, 534 
sentenze, studi, Brescia: Paideia Editrice Brescia  p. 662. 535 
Cox, M., G. Arnold, and S. Villamayor Tomás, 2010. A review of design principles for community-536 
based natural resource management. Ecology and Society 15(4): 38. [online] URL: 537 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss4/art38/ [accessed Feb 27, 2015]. 538 
Dawson, T. P., Rounsevell, M. D., Kluvánková-Oravská, T., Chobotová, V., and Stirling, A., 2010. 539 
Dynamic properties of complex adaptive ecosystems: implications for the sustainability of 540 
service provision. Biodiversity and Conservation, 19, 10, 2843-2853. 541 
 24 
Deisinger, M., 2012. Po poteh dediščine meščanske korporacije. Unpublished material, 94 pages 542 
De Martin, G. C., 1990. I regimi regolieri cadorini tra diritto anteriore vivente e ordinamento 543 
vigente. In: De Martin (Ed.), Comunità di villaggio e proprietà collettiva in Italia e in Europa, 544 
Cedam, Padova.  545 
Dietz, T., Dolšak, N., Ostrom, E., Stern, P.C., 2002. The Drama of the Commons. In: Ostrom et. al. 546 
(eds.) 2002. The Drama of the Commons, DC: National Academy of Sciences. USA.  547 
DiGiano, M. L., Racelis, A. E., 2012. Robustness, adaptation and innovation: Forest communities in 548 
the wake of Hurricane Dean. Applied Geography, 33, 151-158. 549 
Drobnjak, E., 2002. Solastniki gozdov kot specifična lastninska kategorija. VDN 277, Biotehniška 550 
fakulteta, Oddelek za gozdarstvo in obnovljive gozdne vire. 551 
Fabbiani, G., 1972. Breve storia del Cadore. Castaldi, Feltre. 552 
Fleischman, F., Boenning, K., Garcia-Lopez, G. A., Mincey, S., Schmitt-Harsh, M., Daedlow, K., 553 
Ostrom, E., 2010. Disturbance, response, and persistence in self-organized forested 554 
communities: analysis of robustness and resilience in five communities in southern Indiana. 555 
Ecology and Society, 15, 4, 9. 556 
Gatto P., Secco L., Florian D., Pettenella D., 2012. Sustainable local governance and forest 557 
management: the new challenges for Forest Common properties in the Veneto Region (Italian 558 
Eastern Alps). In: Selter, B. (Ed.), Forest Commons - Role Model for Sustainable Local 559 
Governance and Forest Management. Booklet 22 of the State Forestry Administration series 560 
North Rhine-Westphalia, pp. 51-57. 561 
Germanò A., 1994. La tutela della natura civica delle terre e degli usi quale interesse pubblico: il 562 
dictum della Corte costituzionale. Dir. Giur. Agr. Amb. (II), 33-62. 563 
Graberski, 1850. Srenja ali županija. In: Kmetijske in rokodelske novice. 131. 564 
Grossi, P., 1977. Un altro modo di possedere. L’emersione di forme alternative di proprietà alla 565 
coscienza giuridica postcomunitaria, Giuffrè, Milano. 566 
Grossi, P., 1998. I domini collettivi come realtà complessa nei rapporti con il diritto statuale, In: 567 
Nervi, P. (ed.), Un diverso modo di possedere. Un diverso modo di gestire. Cedam, Padova, pp. 568 
13-29. 569 
Hafner, A.,  2011. (Ne)upravljanje s premoženjem agrarnih skupnosti. In: Pravna praksa 30, no. 12. 570 
Hafner, A., 2011a. Še o agrarnih skupnostih : pomanjkljivosti predloga novele ZPVAS-F. In: 571 
Pravna praksa  no. 36 (22.9.2011), 13-15. 572 
Heinmiller, B. T., 2009. Path dependency and collective action in common pool governance, 573 
International Journal of the Commons, 3, 1, 131-147. 574 
 25 
Holmgren, E., Keskitalo, C., E., Lidestav, G., 2010. Swedish forest commons-A matter of 575 
governance? Forest Policy and Economics 12, 6, 423-431. 576 
Ianese, M., 2001. La donna nelle Regole del Comelico. In: Ianese, M. Proprietà collettive e Regole 577 
del Comelico. Master Degree, University of Trieste. Available at 578 
http://www.regole.it/Ita/Approfondimenti/index.php?opzione=0 [Accessed Feb 27, 2015]. 579 
Janssen, M. A., Anderies, J. M., 2007. Robustness trade-offs in social-ecological systems. 580 
International journal of the commons, 1, 1, 43-66. 581 
Jeanrenaud, S., 2001. Communities and Forest management in Western Europe. IUCN, Gland, 582 
Swizerland Available at https://portals.iucn.org/library/efiles/edocs/2001-061.pdf [accessed Sept 583 
23, 2014]. 584 
Kissling-Näf, I., Volken, T., Bisang, K., 2002. Common property and natural resources in the Alps: 585 
the decay of management structures. Forest Policy and Economics, 4, 2, 135-147. 586 
Landolt, G., Haller, T., 2011. Alpine common property institutions under change: conditions for 587 
successful and unsuccessful collective action of dairy farmers in the Canton Grisons of 588 
Switzerland. At: IASC, 14-17 Sept, Plovdiv, Bulgaria. 589 
Lazarevič, Ž., 1994. Kmečki dolgovi na Slovenskem: socialno-ekonomski vidik zadolženosti 590 
slovenskih kmetov 1848-1948. [Farmers debts in Slovenian area: socio-economical view of 591 
Slovenian farmers´debts]. Ljubljana, Slovenija: Znanstveno in publicistično središče. 592 
Lawrence, A., Anglezarke, B., Frost, B., Nolan, P., and Owen, R., 2009. What does community 593 
forestry mean in a devolved Great Britain? International Forestry Review, 11, 281-297. 594 
Legislative Decree 1104/1948. Disposizioni riguardanti le Regole della Magnifica Comunità 595 
Cadorina. GU n.194 of August 21, 1948, Italy. 596 
Lidestav, G., Holmgren, E., Keskitalo, C., 2010. The Swedish forest commons in a rural 597 
development context. In: Proceedings of the Conference Small Scale Forestry in a Changing 598 
World. Opportunities and Challenges and the Role of Extension and Technology Transfer, 355-599 
374. Bled, Slovenia, 2010 600 
Lorenzi, S., Borrini-Feyerabend, G., 2010. Community Conserved Areas: Legal Framework for the 601 
Natural Park of the Ampezzo Dolomites (Italy). IUCN, Gland, Switzerland. 602 
Martello C., Tommasella E., 2010. Analisi comparata degli statuti. In: Cacciavillani I., Gaz E., 603 
Martello C., Tomasella E., Zanderigo Rosolo G. (eds). Manuale di Diritto Regoliero. Belluno: 604 
Istituto Bellunese di Ricerche Sociali e Culturali. Serie ‘Diritto Regoliero’, n. 2. 605 
Merlo, M., Morandini, R., Gabbrielli, A., Novaco, I., 1989. Collective forest land tenure and rural 606 
development in Italy, Selected case studies. FAO Library AN: 310197. 607 
 26 
MKO (Ministrstvo za kmetijstvo in okolje). 2013. Predlog zakona o agrarnih skupnosti, verzija 24. 608 
12. 2013, 22 s.  609 
Mlekuž, I. 1992. Zveza razlaščenih vasi zahteva vrnitev srenjskih gozdov. Gozdarski vestnik 50, 5-610 
6, pp. 314-315. 611 
Mlekuž, I., 2011. Forest Commons at Bovško area. In: Forest Commons – Role Model for 612 
Sustainable Local Governance and Forest Management International Workshop Burbach, 613 
Germany. October 9-11, 2011, proceedings, Booklet 22 of the State Forestry Administration 614 
series North Rhine-Westphalia 615 
Moretto, M., Rosato, P., 2002. The use of common property resources: A dynamic model. 616 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milan. 617 
Nervi, P., 1999. Le ragioni di un incontro scientifico. In: Nervi P. (Ed.): Le terre civiche: dove, per 618 
chi, per che cosa, Cedam, Padova, pp. 1-10. 619 
Netting, R. M., 1976. What Alpine peasants have in common: Observations on communal tenure in 620 
a Swiss village. Human Ecology, 4, 2, 135-146. 621 
Ogrin, D., 1989. Iz življenja komuna v Bezovici. Kronika Časopis za slovensko krajevno 622 
zgodovino. 37: 96-101. 623 
Ostrom, E., 1990. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. 624 
Cambridge University press. 625 
Ostrom, E., Dietz, T., Dolšak, N., Ostrom, E., Stern, P.C. 2002. The Drama of the Commons. DC: 626 
National Academy of Sciences. USA.  627 
Ostrom, E., Janssen M. A., 2004. Multi-level governance and resilience of social-ecological 628 
systems In: Spoor, M. (Ed.): Globalisation, Poverty and Conflict, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 629 
The Netherlands, pp. 239–259. 630 
Pertile, A., 1889. Laudi del Cadore. Venezia: Istituto Veneto delle Scienze, Lettere ed Arti. 631 
Pieraccini, M., 2013. A politicized, legal pluralist analysis of the Commons’ resilience: The case of 632 
the Regole d’Ampezzo. Ecology and Society, 18, 1, 4. 633 
Petek, F., Urbanc, M., 2007. Skupna zemljišča v Sloveniji. Geografski vestnik, 79, 2, 41-62. 634 
Pravila agrarne skupnosti Meščanska korporacija Kamnik, 2012. 12 p., 24.5.2012 (unpubl.) 635 
Premrl, T. , 2008. Organizacija gozdarskih del v gozdovih agrarne skupnosti Ravnik-Orlovše. 636 
[Forest work organisation in forests of agrarian community Ravnik-Orlovše]. Bachelor’s thesis 637 
DN 1150, University of Ljubljana, Slovenija. 638 
Ravtar, F., 1938. Gozdno gospodarstvo agrarnih skupnosti. In: Za naš gozd. Gozdarska anketa 639 
1941. – Zbornik referatov prvega posveta o stanju gozdarstva na Slovenskem, Ljubljana, 27. 640 
 27 
februarja do 1. marca 1941; Gozdarska založba pri Zvezi gozdarskih društev Slovenije, 641 
Ljubljana, oktober 2012 642 
Rodela, R., 2012. (ed.), Soupravljanje naravnih virov: vaške skupnosti in sorodne oblike skupne 643 
lastnine in skupnega upravljanja. Wageningen: Wageningen University and Research Centre. 644 
Rubio-Perez, L., Fernándeza, L., 2013. Commons and councils: agrarian collectivism and balanced 645 
development in the north of Spain in the modern period. European Review of History, 20, 4, 646 
611-626. 647 
Rutar, S., 1896. Slovenska zemlja. Opis slovenskih pokrajin. II. del Trst in Istra. Samosvoje mesto 648 
Trst in mejna grofija Istra. Ljubljana. 649 
SFS, 2012. Poročilo Zavoda za gozdove Slovenije za leto 2011. Zavod za gozdove Slovenije, 650 
Ljubljana. 651 
Smrdel, I., 1991. Prelomna in druga bistvena gospodarska dogajanja v zgodovini agrarnih panog v 652 
19. stoletju na Slovenskem; In: Slovenski etnograf, 33/34 (1988/90), p. 25-60, Slovenski 653 
etnografski muzej, Ljubljana (web-accessed 17.9.2014) 654 
SSKJ, 2000. Slovar slovenskega knjižnega jezika, spletna izdaja, Ljubljana SAZU, ZRC SAZU, 655 
Inštitut za slovenski jezik Frana Ramovša ZRC SAZU; URL http://bos.zrc-sazu.si/sskj.html 656 
[accessed Jan 23, 2014]. 657 
SIUSA, 2015. Sistema Archivistico Unificato per le Soprintendenze Archivistiche. Regola, Area 658 
Alpina, Secolo XI. Available at: http://siusa.archivi.beniculturali.it/cgi-659 
bin/pagina.pl?TipoPag=profist&Chiave=416&RicDimF=2 [Accessed March 3, 2015].  660 
Šimac, R., 1993. Najstarejša oblika lastnine zemlje pri Slovencih: po sledeh jusov, komunele in 661 
skupnine. Primorske novice, no. 43, June 4 662 
Šprajcar, M., 2012. Upravljanje s skupnimi zemljišči in lastnino z vidika trajnosti. Univerza v Novi 663 
Gorici, Fakulteta za znanosti o okolju (Bachelor thesis), 64. p. 664 
Tagliapietra, C., 2011. Charters, partnerships and natural resources: Two cases of endogenous 665 
regulation in Italy. Economic Affairs, 31, 2, 30-35. 666 
van Gils, H., Siegl, G., Bennet, R.M., 2014. The living commons of West Tyrol, Austria: Lessons 667 
for land policy and land administration. Land Use Policy, 38, 16-25. 668 
Vilfan, S., 1980. Soseske in druge podeželske skupnosti. Gospodarska in družbena zgodovina 669 
Slovencev, Zgodovina agrarnih panog 2: 9-74. 670 
Volčič, E., 1895. O naših agrarskih operacijah in dotičnih zakonih. Slovenski pravnik, 11, 2. 671 
Yin, R. K., 2003. Case studies research: design and methods. Thousand Oaks, Sage. 672 
 28 
Young, O. R., Berkhout, F., Gallopin, G. C., Janssen, M. A., Ostrom, E., van der Leeuw, S., 2006. 673 
The globalization of socio-ecological systems: An agenda for scientific research. Global 674 
Environmental Change, 16, 3, 304-316. 675 
Zanderigo Rosolo, G., 1982. Appunti per la storia delle regole del Cadore nei secoli XIII-XIV. 676 
Istituto per le Ricerche Sociali e Culturali, Belluno. 677 
Zoccoletto, G., 2013. Le Regole d’Alpago: Catastico dei beni antichi. Comitato Costitutivo della 678 
Regola di Plois e Curago. Liberalato, Venezia. 679 
Interview 1 (recorded), Sežana, 2. 6. 2012, initiator of the restitution legislation 680 
Interview 2, Sežana, 18. 7. 2014, representative from Italian Consulta and representative in 681 
Slovenian Association of FCs 682 
Interview 3, Čezsoča, 12. 6. 2010, president of FC, leader of Management Committee, forestry 683 
professional 684 
Interview 3 a, Čezsoča, 31.5. 2011, same as Interview 3 685 
Interview 3 b, Čezsoča, 21.7.2014, same as Interviews 3 and 3a 686 
Interview 4, Bohinjska Bistrica, 29.7.2014, director of the National park 687 
Interview 5, Kamnik, 1.10. 2014 president of FC, leaders of Management Committee and tribunal 688 
Interview 6, Ljubinj, 12. 9. 2012 In: Šprajcar, 2012. 689 
